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Abstract 
Most corporate loans are priced at rounded spreads, e.g. spreads that are a multiple of 25 basis points. 
Using a sample of 16,598 loan tranches signed by US borrowers between January 1988 and December 
2010, this study explores the determinants of such interest rate clustering in the corporate syndicated 
loan market. We postulate that lead arrangers round spreads upwards because of the uncertainty about 
the riskiness of the borrowers. Consistent with this negotiation hypothesis, we find that clustering 
increases with the degree of uncertainty, e.g. the degree of information asymmetry between the lead 
arranger and the borrower. In contrast, clustering is less likely when lead arrangers have acquired 
information about the borrower through prior interactions. Finally, the fear of reputation loss 
incentivizes the most reputable lead arrangers to price loans at more competitive non-rounded spreads. 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyses interest rate clustering as well as its determinants in the corporate loan 
market. Interest rate clustering refers to the tendency of spreads to occur most frequently at a small set 
of spreads, thus leading to a non-uniform distribution of spreads. The efficient market hypothesis 
asserts that prices rationally reflect public information about fundamental values. In an efficient capital 
market, the prices of loans should reflect the fundamental values of the borrower and the loan, i.e. 
default risk and loss given default. Across a small range of spreads, for example from 24 to 26 bp, the 
distribution should thus be relatively uniform and not clustered at specific spread levels.
1
 On the 
contrary, Figure 1 shows clear evidence for the clustering of interest rate spreads in the US loan 
market. In particular, the distribution clusters around spreads that are multiples of 25 basis points (bp) 
above LIBOR. This clustering tendency increases at higher spread levels. While in Figure 1 non-
rounded spreads can be observed at low and moderate spread level, there are hardly any loans with 
non-rounded spreads above 300 bp. In the right tail of the distribution, 98% of loans with spreads of 
300 bp or more are rounded.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Why do corporate loan spreads cluster at multiples of 25 bp? Why does clustering increase at 
higher levels of spreads? To answer these questions, we adapt the negotiation hypothesis to the 
corporate loan market. The negotiation hypothesis was originally presented by Ball et al. (1985) and 
Harris (1991) in the context of gold and stock price clustering, respectively. It postulates that 
clustering increases with the price level and the degree of uncertainty about the value of an asset. If the 
value of an asset is uncertain, traders must negotiate the exact price. Traders offer a limited set of 
prices in order to restrict the range of different bids and offers that can be made. Negotiations thus 
converge more quickly as counteroffers are restricted. The higher the uncertainty about the value, the 
wider the potential ranges of bids and offers and thus the higher the benefits of price restrictions. In 
the corporate syndicated loan market, uncertainty arises due to information asymmetry between lead 
arranger and borrower. During the loan syndication phase, borrowers have an information advantage 
regarding the quality of their investment and the effort they are willing to make after the investment 
has been financed. Rather than attempting to completely eliminate all information asymmetries and to 
price the loan at its exact risk premium, arrangers can speed up the syndication process by limiting the 
pricing negotiation to a set of acceptable spreads. Therefore, spreads are more likely to be rounded for 
loans with more substantial information asymmetries.  
                                                          
1
 This argument was first made by Osborne (1962) and Niederhoffer (1966) when describing clustering in stock 
prices. 
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Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, most corporate loans in the syndicated loan 
market are priced at rounded spreads that are a multiple of 25 bp and these spreads are rounded 
upward. Second, clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty between the lead arranger and the 
borrower. Third, a previous relationship between lead arranger and borrower reduces uncertainty and 
hence persuades lead arrangers to provide loans at exact spreads. Finally, the most reputable lead 
arrangers offer loans at competitive non-rounded spreads because of fear of loss of reputation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the evidence and 
explanations of price clustering in different financial markets while section 3 presents factual evidence 
regarding the price clustering in the US corporate loan market in particular. Section 4 explores to what 
extent the negotiation hypothesis explains the observed clustering of spreads. Section 5 provides 
robustness checks and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Price Clustering in Financial Markets 
In many financial markets prices tend to cluster around rounded integers. For example, 
clustering exists in the stock market (Niederhoffer, 1966; Harris, 1991; Christie and Schultz, 1994; 
Ikenberry and Weston, 2007), in the foreign exchange market (Goodhart and Curcio, 1990; 
Sopranzetti and Datar, 2002), in the real estate market (Colwell et al., 1990), in the gold market (Ball 
et al., 1985), in the loan deposit market (Kahn et al., 1999; Ashton and Hudson, 2007) and in the IPO 
market (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ibbotson et al., 1994; Kandel et al., 2001).  
Next to negotiation benefits, the observed clustering is typically explained by tacit collusion or 
behavioral arguments. According to the tacit collusion hypothesis, financiers do not compete by 
offering lower prices but collude instead and are thus able to maintain higher, rounded prices in a 
given financial market. Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie et al. (1994) find evidence for tacit 
collusion of NASDAQ dealers who set rounded prices in order to maintain wider non-competitive bid-
ask spreads and hence maximize profits. Similarly, in the IPO market, Chen and Ritter (2000) use tacit 
collusion (which they term as strategic pricing) among investment bankers as an explanation of the 
high average spread, and the high frequency of seven percent spreads in this market.  Tacit collusion 
might well apply to the corporate loan market which is highly concentrated, e.g. where only a few lead 
arrangers capture substantial market share. However, our findings will indicate that lead arrangers with 
the highest market share are actually less likely to offer rounded spreads. We thus favor the 
negotiation hypothesis over the tacit collusion hypothesis. 
For the retail banking market, Kahn et al. (1999) and Ashton and Hudson (2008) provide a 
behavioral explanation for clustering. Kahn et al. (1999) develop a limited recall model and show, 
both theoretically and empirically, that retail deposit rates cluster around integers and even fractions. 
They argue that individuals tend to memorize truncated prices rather than full prices and clustering 
arises due to limited number recall. In their model, two extreme types of depositors exist – 
sophisticated depositors with full-recall and naïve depositors who remember only the integer of the 
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deposit rate. Banks maximize revenue from naïve depositors who truncate numbers. As naïve 
depositors truncate interest rates to the nearest full integer, they perceive rates of 6.1% or 6.7% or 
6.99% as equal to 6% and the bank can thus maximize profits by setting the interest rate to 6%. With 
many more naïve than full-recall depositors in the market, interest rates will cluster at integers.  
Ashton and Hudson (2008) add rounding to truncation in the customers’ limited recall model and 
confirm that in the UK retail deposit and mortgage markets interest rate clustering occurs in a manner 
consistent with bank’s profit maximization. While deposit rates cluster at integers, mortgage rates 
cluster just below integers. Using the same example as above, naïve borrowers would truncate 
mortgage rates of 6.1% or 6.7% or 6.99% to 6% and the bank maximizes profits by setting the 
mortgage rate to 6.99%. While limited recall can explain clustering in the retail mortgage market, it 
fails to apply in the corporate loan market where spreads are clustered at whole, half or quarters of a 
percent rather than just below it. We therefore explore an explanation based on negotiation cost 
instead. 
 
3. Spread Clustering in the US Corporate Loan Market 
The negotiation hypothesis postulates that negotiations about the price of an asset whose value 
is uncertain converge more quickly when counteroffers are restricted to a limited set of prices. The 
higher the uncertainty about the asset’s value, the wider the potential ranges of price offers and 
counteroffers and the higher the benefits of price restrictions. In order to test whether the negotiation 
hypothesis can explain the observed clustering of corporate loan spreads, we examine 16,598 loan 
tranches raised by US borrowers between January 1988 and December 2010 that are priced at a spread 
relative to LIBOR. We obtain these data from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan 
database. Our sample includes all loans for which the borrower name and industry, loan purpose, 
tranche amount, date of loan signing, loan maturity, identity and lending shares of the syndicate 
members, base rate and margin and the borrower’s sales volume at loan signing are available in the 
database.  
We focus on the tranche rather than deal level, as interest rates are tranche specific. We extract 
the spread over LIBOR from the “Base Rate Margin” field in Dealscan. In case of multiple base rates 
for a single tranche, we only consider the LIBOR-based spread and disregard the spreads over other 
base rates. A spread is considered to be rounded if it is a multiple of 25 bp. In addition to Figure 1 
above, Table I shows the distribution of spreads in more detail. Rounded spreads occur for 64% of all 
observations. Among the 16,598 loans, 28 spread levels occur more than 100 times and 16 of these 
spreads are rounded, e.g. the spreads are multiples of 25 bps. Among these 28 spreads, the 11 most 
frequently occurring spreads are all rounded and account for 57% of our sample. In total, our 16,598 
tranches are priced at 302 different spread levels of which 40 (13.2%) are rounded. However, these 
13.2% of spread levels disproportionally account for 65.5% of all tranches. Thus, spreads are clearly 
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clustered at rounded levels and rounded spreads are the rule rather than the exception in the US 
corporate loan market.  
 
[Insert Table I about here] 
 
Evidence provided by Kahn et al. (1999) and Ashton and Hudson (2008) for the UK retail 
banking market indicates that banks maximize profits, e.g. round or truncate interest rates in the 
bank’s favor. Therefore we first want to establish whether or not banks in the corporate loan market 
also round spreads in their favor. To do so, we estimate loan-pricing regressions in which the actual 
spread in bp over LIBOR serves as the dependent variable. In line with the empirical loan pricing 
literature (see for example Booth, 1992; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Carey and Nini, 2007; Ivashina, 
2009; Gatti et al., 2012), we model the spread as a function of borrower and loan characteristics and  
consider the following potential determinants of loan spreads: The borrower’s risk based on its rating, 
borrower size based on sales in millions of US dollar, tranche size in millions of US dollar, tranche 
maturity in years, and dummies identifying secured tranches, senior tranches, tranches with covenants, 
term loans and tranches belonging to multiple-tranche deals. We also include year, industry and loan 
purpose dummies.
2
  
Table II provides a loan pricing regression based on our sample of 16,598 tranches. To 
investigate whether spreads are on average rounded upwards or downwards, we include a dummy 
equal to 1 if the spread is rounded, e.g. is a multiple of 25 bp, and 0 otherwise. In regression 1 we 
include only borrower characteristics. In regression 2, we add the potentially endogenous loan 
characteristics. However, as a comparison between regressions 1 and 2 shows, the inclusion of the 
loan characteristics does not change the sign and significance of the borrower characteristics’ 
coefficients. In general, the coefficients of our explanatory variables are in line with the existing loan 
pricing evidence. Our interest focusses on the coefficient for the rounded spread dummy. We find 
positive coefficients indicating that loans with rounded spreads are on average 74.60 bp (regression 1) 
or 53.05 bp (regression 2) more expensive than loans with non-rounded spreads.  To further this 
evidence, we estimate loan-pricing regressions on the sub-sample of 5,721 loans that are priced at 
exact, e.g. non-rounded spreads over LIBOR. Results are shown in Panel A of Table III. Based on 
these regressions, we predict what the exact spread should have been for those 10,877 tranches that are 
actually priced a rounded spreads. In Panel B of Table III, we find that the average actual spread is 
much higher than the predicted spread i.e., 74.9 and 57.3 bp for regression 1 and regression 2 
respectively, a result which is in line with the coefficients of the rounded spread dummy in Table II. 
About ¾ of loan tranches have actual rounded spreads higher than their predicted spread. We conclude 
                                                          
2
 The exact definition of all the variables is given in Table A-I in the Appendix. 
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from this finding that lead arrangers in the corporate loan market act in their own interest similar to 
banks in the retail mortgage market.  
 
[Insert Tables II and III about here] 
 
4. Explaining Spread Clustering with the Negotiation Hypothesis 
 According to the negotiation hypothesis, the bank’s uncertainty about the true value and risk of the 
loan is the core determinant of spread clustering. When faced with moderate uncertainty, banks can 
reduce information asymmetries by screening the borrower and thus price the loan at an appropriate 
and relatively exact risk premium. However, when the banks face substantial information 
asymmetries, screening might be too costly and banks can instead opt to enter into a price negotiation 
process with the borrower in which possible spreads are limited and the loan is ultimately priced at an 
approximate, upward-rounded spread. Consequently, the negotiation hypothesis predicts that spreads 
are more likely to be rounded for loans with more substantial information asymmetries. To test this 
prediction, we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is defined as 1 if the loan is 
priced at a rounded spread and 0 otherwise.  
 We consider several proxies for the information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower 
that reflect the bank’s uncertainty about the true price of the loan. Our first two proxies are direct 
measures for the amount of information asymmetry between lender and borrower. We consider 
whether or not a borrower has a rating and whether or not it has a ticker indicating that it has traded 
securities outstanding. The existence of a rating or ticker indicates that information about the borrower 
is more easily available either directly from a rating agency or indirectly through the public 
information requirements that go hand in hand with a security listing (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; 
Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Chaudhry and Kleimeier, 2012). We classify a borrower as an 
unrated borrower if no S&P senior debt rating is available and as a borrower without ticker if no 
ticker is available in the Dealscan database. Both proxies are coded as dummies which take the value 
of 1 if information asymmetry is higher and 0 otherwise. 
In addition we employ two proxies that measure whether the borrower is known to the corporate 
loan market. First, we postulate that if the borrower has accessed the loan market in the past, he is 
already known among banks and information asymmetry may therefore be reduced (Sufi, 2007; 
Chaudhry and Kleimeier, 2012). In line with Chaudhry and Kleimeier (2012) who find stronger effects 
of information asymmetry reduction for more recent the borrowers, we define previous borrower as 
the number of loans a borrower raised during the previous three years. Second, we consider whether or 
not the lead arranger of the current loan is a former lead arranger, e.g. has a prior lending relationship 
with the borrower and thus faces less information asymmetry. Sufi (2007) was the first one to consider 
this proxy as a measure of information asymmetry while earlier studies by Dennis and Mullineaux 
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(2000) and Lee and Mullineaux (2004) interpreted this proxy as a measure of the lead arranger’s 
reputation.  We follow Sufi’s information asymmetry interpretation and define our proxy of former 
lead arranger as a dummy equal to 1 if the current lead arranger has also served as a lead arranger for 
the borrower during the prior three years and 0 otherwise.  
Next we consider the riskiness of the borrower. Figure 1 shows that at high levels of spreads, 
e.g. for risky borrowers, there are very few non-rounded spreads. For example among the 1,198 
tranches with spreads above 300 bp, only 45 tranches (3.8%) are priced at non-rounded spreads. These 
observations are in line with the negotiation hypothesis as the potential range of price offers and 
counteroffers is wider at higher price levels and thus the benefits of price restrictions are more 
substantial. Our model therefore includes a proxy for the loan tranche’s actual spread level in basis 
points above LIBOR.  
According to Ashton and Hudson (2008), the degree of price or interest rate clustering appears 
to be prominent when low levels of financial involvement are concerned. We postulate that the 
financial stake increases with the size of the loan – either in absolute terms or relative to borrower size 
– and borrowers are more inclined to negotiate for exact spreads when loans are large. Our first proxy 
of relative loan size is calculated as the tranche amount divided by borrower sales. Secondly, we 
create a large loan dummy, which is equal to 1 if the loan in terms of relative loan size belongs to the 
top 33 percentile and 0 otherwise. 
As our loan pricing analysis has shown, spreads are rounded upwards leading to higher cost for 
the borrower. However, fear of reputational loss might prevent lead arrangers from engaging in such 
profit maximizing behavior. We therefore postulate that more reputable lead arrangers are less likely 
to offer rounded spreads. We measure reputation as the lead arranger market share in the year prior to 
loan signing. However, as the corporate syndicated loan market is highly concentrated, and only a few 
lead arrangers capture substantial market shares, we also consider a top lead arranger dummy which 
is coded as 1 if the lead arranger is among the three lead arrangers with the highest market share in the 
corporate loan market in the year prior to loan signing and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, we control for unobserved industry, year and loan purpose effect by including the 
respective dummies.  
Table IV provides descriptive statistics for all tranches, for tranches with rounded spreads and 
for tranches with non-rounded spreads, respectively. Our sample contains 10,877 loan tranches with 
rounded spreads and 5,721 loan tranches with non-rounded spreads. Regarding our primary dependent 
variable the mean spread above LIBOR in basis points is 157.85 bp with a standard deviation of 
113.48 bp for all the tranches. However, the mean spread of tranches with rounded spreads is 200.52 
bp and as such substantially higher than mean spread of non-rounded spread of 76.74 bp. This 
observation leads us provide robustness checks where we exclude loans with extreme spreads from the 
sample. Each loan tranche has on average two base rates. For example, a loan could be priced at both 
LIBOR plus 50 bp and PRIME plus 75 bp and the borrowers can choose at each payment date which 
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interest rate to pay. Here loans with rounded LIBOR spreads clearly differ from loans with non-
rounded LIBOR spreads: For the former group of loans, the average fraction of base rates with 
rounded spreads is 0.97 indicating that if the LIBOR spread is rounded, almost all the other spreads 
are rounded too. For the latter group of loans, however, this fraction is only 0.39. While our main 
analysis focuses on the rounded versus non-rounded spread above LIBOR, we investigate the number 
of rounded spreads per tranche in a robustness check. 
Regarding the potential determinants of rounded spreads, rounded spreads more frequent when 
the information asymmetry between borrower and lender is high. In particular, 68% of all tranches 
with rounded spreads are raised by unrated borrowers compared to only 41.7% of tranches with non-
rounded spreads. Similar differences can be found for borrowers without ticker (36.6% versus 24.2%).   
Previous borrowers are more likely to borrow at non-rounded spreads and former lead arrangers are 
more likely to lend at non-rounded spreads (44.2% versus 34.2%). Overall, these univariate results 
provide the first evidence in support of the negotiation hypothesis. In addition, more important loans 
are less frequently rounded but standard deviations as tranches with non-rounded spreads are larger by 
on average 50% in terms of relative loan size. Finally, we observe that more reputable lead arrangers 
are less likely to offer loans at rounded spreads. However, this pattern is most distinct only for the 
most reputable lead arrangers. 
 
 [Insert Table IV about here] 
 
Panel A of Table V reports our baseline results regarding the negotiation hypothesis. Here we 
include our explanatory variables in different combinations: Regressions 1 and 2 use our lead 
arranger market share proxy while regressions 3 and 4 use the top lead arranger proxy. In regressions 
1 and 3 we employ only the relative loan size proxy while we add the large loan dummy in 
regressions 2 and 4. As our dependent variable is a dummy, we estimate logit regressions and report 
marginal effects. Our results indicate that rounded spreads are more likely when information 
asymmetry is stronger. In line with the negotiation cost hypothesis, the marginal effects for an unrated 
borrower and a borrower without ticker are significantly positive while the marginal effect of former 
lead arranger is significantly negative. In contrast, being a previous borrower appears to reduce 
information asymmetry and thus clustering only marginally. As expected clustering is more frequent 
when spreads are high indicating that uncertainty about the riskiness of the borrower matters, e.g. that 
the benefits of price restrictions are more substantial at higher spread levels. Furthermore, financial 
involvement matters only for the largest loans – here the negative marginal effect indicates that 
borrowers are indeed inclined to negotiate for exact spreads when loans are very large. Finally, the 
insignificant marginal effect of lead arranger market share compare to the significantly negative 
marginal effect of top lead arranger indicates that reputational concerns only appear to affect the most 
reputable banks. We therefore conclude that only the most reputable lead arrangers do not exploit the 
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borrower by rounding the interest rate spreads upwards as they are concerned about their loss of 
reputation.  
Based on regression 4 of Panel A, Panel B of Table V considers the economic impact of our 
clustering determinants in more detail. We reports the changes in predicted probabilities of loan being 
priced at a rounded spread above LIBOR based on a one-standard deviation change in an independent 
continuous variable or a change from 0 to 1 for an independent dummy variable. The lack of a rating 
has the highest impact: Unrated borrowers are 46.7% more likely to borrow at a rounded spread than 
rated borrowers. Secondly, borrowers with higher spread levels are 32.0% more likely to borrow at 
rounded spreads as compared to the borrowers with lower spread levels. Thirdly, large loans are 
14.3% less likely to be priced at rounded spreads. For our other proxies, the impact is substantially 
lower.  
 
[Insert Table V about here] 
 
So far we assumed that all spreads that are a multiple of 25 bp are rounded. Now, we consider 
different levels of rounding with the expectation that more severe the uncertainty leads to a more 
restricted negotiation options and thus to more extreme rounding. To differentiate these different 
levels of rounding we estimate an ordered logit model in Table VI. In model 1, we focus on three 
categories of spreads: no rounding, rounding at multiples of 25 bp but not 50 bp, rounding at multiples 
of 50 bp. In model 2, we focus on four categories of spreads: no rounding, rounding at multiples of 25 
bp but not 50 bp or 100 bp, rounding at multiples of 50 bp but not 100 bp, rounding at multiples of 100 
bp.  
 Model 1 shows that the impact of borrower without ticker and former lead arranger are only 
significant for spreads rounded at multiples of 50 bp while the impact of unrated borrower, spread 
level, large loan and top lead arranger is substantially stronger for rounding at the level of 50 bp. 
Model 2 however reveals that the effects do not change any further when rounding at multiples of 100 
bp are considered in addition. With the exception of unrated borrower, the marginal effects are 
identical for the 50 bp and 100 bp rounding levels. Overall, we therefore conclude that uncertainty 
about the true price of the loan leads to rounding at multiples of at least 25 bp and that higher levels of 
uncertainty leads to more severe rounding with the main impact confined to multiples of 50 bp.  
 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 As we noticed in Figure I that there are numerous observations with large spreads and these 
are more frequently rounded. In our benchmark analysis in Table III, we already control for this 
feature of the corporate loan market by including the loan’s actual spread. In order to additionally 
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check the robustness of our results, we exclude observations with extreme spreads and re-estimate 
regression 4 of Table V with these reduced samples. We exclude tranches that fall into the top 1%, top 
5%, top and bottom 1% and top and bottom 1% of the spread distribution, respectively. Table VII 
presents our findings and shows that our results are robust and not driven by tranches with extreme 
spreads.  
 
[Insert Table VII about here] 
 
 Next we consider an alternative proxy for our dependent variable. As a single tranche can be 
priced relative to multiple base rates, we consider the fraction of base rates with rounded spreads 
relative to the total number of base rates. In Table VII we replicate regression 4 of Table V but use our 
alternative dependent variable and estimate a tobit regression. Our results are robust as we find that all 
of our variables carry the same signs and significance except lead arranger reputation. We therefore 
conclude that there is indeed uncertainty driven by information asymmetry between the borrower and 
the lead arranger, leading to rounded interest rate spreads in the corporate loan market. 
 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Based on the observation that spreads in the US corporate loan market cluster at certain levels, 
we set out to answer two questions: Why do corporate loan spreads cluster? Why does clustering 
increase at higher levels of spreads? Our results support the negotiation hypothesis which postulates 
that negotiations about the price of an asset whose value is uncertain converge more quickly when 
counteroffers are restricted to a limited set of prices. The higher the uncertainty about the asset’s 
value, the wider the potential ranges of price offers and counteroffers and the higher the benefits of 
price restrictions. In the corporate loan market, clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty, e.g. 
information asymmetry between the lead arranger and the borrower. However, a previous lending 
relationship between lead arranger and borrower reduces this uncertainty and hence persuades lead 
arrangers to provide loans at exact spreads. As loans are generally priced at upwardly rounded spreads, 
we can observe that the most reputable lead arrangers offer loans at competitive non-rounded spreads 
because of fear of loss of reputation. 
Our findings have clear implications for market participants i.e. corporate managers.  
Information asymmetries between corporations and their financiers are known to negatively affect 
access to finance (Diamond, 1984; Battahcharya and Thakor, 1993). Petersen and Rajan (1994) for 
example show that small businesses benefit from closer ties with banks and can raise funds more 
easily. Cole (1998) also shows that firms with pre-existing relationships with a bank are less credit 
constrained. Our study identifies an additional adverse effect of information asymmetry: In addition to 
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limited access to credit, informationally opaque borrowers who nevertheless manage to raise loan 
financing are only able to do so at a higher cost. Reducing information asymmetries will thus be 
doubly beneficial to these borrowers. This is especially important after the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
Loans markets are only slowly recovering from severe credit rationing and access to loan finance is 
difficult not only but especially so for informationally opaque companies. As the economic effects of 
the crisis are still strongly felt in terms of low economic growth and reduced corporate profit margins, 
access to low-cost funding is critical. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
[Insert Table A-I here] 
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Notes: This figure shows the number of loan tranches for a given spread in basis points (bp) above LIBOR. The total sample consists of 16,598 tranches raised
by US borrowers from 1988 to 2010. For frequencies above 500 tranches, the numbers above the bars indicate the spread in bp. The sample contains 37 tranches
with spreads above 700 bp which are not shown in the histogram.
Figure I
The distribution of spreads 
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Spread in bp
Number of 
tranches % of sample
Cumulative % 
of sample
250 1,202 7.2% 7.2%
150 1,096 6.6% 13.8%
200 1,011 6.1% 19.9%
175 930 5.6% 25.5%
225 852 5.1% 30.7%
125 827 5.0% 35.7%
100 805 4.8% 40.5%
275 770 4.6% 45.1%
300 693 4.2% 49.3%
75 665 4.0% 53.3%
50 605 3.6% 57.0%
62.5 342 2.1% 59.0%
325 299 1.8% 60.8%
350 273 1.6% 62.5%
37.5 263 1.6% 64.1%
25 257 1.5% 65.6%
87.5 239 1.4% 67.1%
112.5 181 1.1% 68.1%
40 179 1.1% 69.2%
137.5 163 1.0% 70.2%
30 147 0.9% 71.1%
60 144 0.9% 72.0%
162.5 141 0.8% 72.8%
375 137 0.8% 73.6%
35 134 0.8% 74.4%
400 133 0.8% 75.2%
20 131 0.8% 76.0%
45 130 0.8% 76.8%
All other spread levels
  Of which 24 are rounded spread levels 395 2.4%
  Of which 250 are non-rounded spread levels 3,457 20.8%
Total 16,598 100.0%
This table shows the distribution of loans across different spread levels. A spread is considered
to be rounded if it is a multiple of 25 basis points above LIBOR. Only spreads which are applied
to 100 loans or more are shown. 
Table I
The distribution of spreads
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Dependent variable
Intercept 348.89 *** 337.96 ***
15.31 13.90
Rounded spreadD 74.60 *** 53.05 ***
38.66 29.91
S&P senior debt rating class BD 38.41 *** 25.47 ***
13.90 10.24
S&P senior debt rating class CD 46.20 *** 35.70 ***
20.18 17.37
S&P senior debt rating class DD 119.38 *** 92.51 ***
9.75 7.47
Unrated borrowerD 137.75 *** 105.65 ***
6.71 5.35
Borrower size -17.26 *** -8.22 ***
-24.01 -10.54
Tranche size -10.93 ***
-13.47
Loan maturity -2.30 *
-1.72
SecuredD 54.95 ***
26.71
SeniorD -9.66 ***
-2.60
CovenantsD 5.02
0.64
Term loanD 15.35 ***
6.48
Multiple trancheD 18.10 ***
10.41
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Loan purpose dummies yes yes
Adjusted R
2
0.476 0.547
Number of observations 16,598 16,598
This table shows results of an OLS regression based on a sample of loans which are
priced at both rounded as well as non-rounded spreads. The rounded spread dummy
indicates a spread that is a mulitple of 25 bp. For each independent variable, the
coefficient is reported in the top row and the t-statistic is reported in the bottom row.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level. Subscript D
indicates a dummy variable.
(2)(1)
Spread above LIBOR
Table II
Loan pricing analysis
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Intercept 752.11 *** 779.98 ***
32.05 28.53
S&P senior debt rating class BD 32.52 *** 27.89 ***
18.04 16.40
S&P senior debt rating class CD 132.67 *** 97.19 ***
5.11 3.61
S&P senior debt rating class DD 162.09 *** 143.55 ***
2.79 3.28
Unrated borrowerD 35.61 *** 25.75 ***
14.04 11.20
Borrower size -14.93 *** -8.45 ***
-18.41 -11.39
Tranche size -7.02 ***
-7.83
Loan maturity -1.29
-1.06
SecuredD 48.92 ***
16.88
SeniorD -10.56 **
-2.04
CovenantsD -5.12
-0.52
Term loanD 12.88 ***
3.91
Multiple trancheD 9.72 ***
4.83
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Loan purpose dummies yes yes
Adjusted R
2
0.439 0.538
Number of observations 5,721 5,721
Panel B: Comparing predicted and actual spreads for loans with rounded spreads
Average predicted spread in bp 125.6 143.3
Average actual spread in bp 200.5 200.5
Average actual minus predicted spread in bp 74.9 57.3
% of loans with actual spread > predicted spread 79% 75%
Total number of loans with rounded spreads 10,877 10,877
Table III
Loan pricing analysis
Panel A shows results of an OLS regression based on a sample of loans which are priced at non-
rounded spreads over LIBOR. A spread is considered to be non-rounded when it is not a mulitple of 25
bp. For each independent variable, the coefficient is reported in the top row and the t-statistic is
reported in the bottom row. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level.
Subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
Spread
(1) (2)
Panel A: Loan pricing regression for loans with non-rounded spreads
18 
 
 
 
Dummy 
equal to 1 Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Dummy 
equal to 1 Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Dummy 
equal to 1 Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Spread level 157.85 113.48 -20.00 1,300.00 200.52 109.47 0.00 1300.00 76.74 67.36 -20.00 921.00
Number of different base rates 2.00 0.53 1.00 6.00 2.00 0.50 1.00 4.00 2.01 0.58 1.00 6.00
Fraction of base rates with 
rounded spreads 0.77 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.97 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.23 0.00 1.00
Unrated borrowerD 59.0% 68.0% 41.7%
Borrower without tickerD 32.4% 36.6% 24.2%
Previous borrower 0.83 1.41 0.00 31.00 0.72 1.38 0.00 31.00 1.03 1.45 0.00 15.00
Former lead arrangerD 37.7% 34.2% 44.2%
Relative loan size 0.73 10.77 0.00 1,250.00 0.64 3.95 0.00 186.57 0.91 17.52 0.00 1,250.00
Large loanD 43.7% 31.5% 66.9%
Top lead arrangerD 24.9% 19.7% 34.8%
Table IV
All tranches Tranches with rounded spreads Tranches with non-rounded spreads
This table shows the characteristics of loans, borrowers and lenders for the sample of 16,598 loans with LIBOR as base rate. A spread is considered to be rounded if it is a multiple of 25 basis points
above LIBOR. The sample contains 10,877 loans with rounded spreads and 5,721 loans with non-rounded spreads. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
Descriptive statistics
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Dependent variable
(4)
Unrated borrowerD 0.544 *** 0.466 *** 0.535 *** 0.460 ***
38.390 28.670 37.190 28.160
Borrower without tickerD 0.043 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 0.039 ***
3.520 3.290 3.460 3.220
Previous borrower -0.019 * -0.011 -0.018 * -0.011
-1.730 -1.020 -1.600 -0.950
Former lead arrangerD -0.029 *** -0.026 ** -0.029 *** -0.027 **
-2.640 -2.360 -2.680 -2.400
Spread level 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ***
27.310 25.530 27.110 25.400
Relative loan size -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
-0.750 -0.300 -0.750 -0.370
Large loanD -0.176 *** -0.168 ***
-15.150 -14.530
Lead arranger market share -0.396 -0.165
-1.440 -0.590
Top lead arrangerD -0.083 *** -0.065 ***
-6.480 -4.980
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Loan purpose dummies yes yes yes yes
Pseudo log-likelihood -8,049 -7,885 -8,019 -7,866
Pseudo R
2
0.245 0.260 0.248 0.262
Number of observations 16,598 16,598 16,598 16,598
(1) (2) (3)
Table V
Determinants of spread rounding
This table shows results of logit regressions. The dependent variable is coded as 1 when the 
spread over LIBOR of the loan tranche is rounded at 25 bp or a mutliple thereof and 0
otherwise. In Panel A, the marginal effect is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is
reported in the bottom row. For dummy variables, the marginal effect of a change from 0
to 1 is reported. All marginal effects are calculated at the means. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level. In Panel B, the predicted
probabilities of a rounded spread are reported when the respective independent variable
moves from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a standard deviation above the
mean. For dummy variables a shift from 0 to 1 is considered instead. All other independent
variables are set to their means.  Subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
Panel A: Marginal effects
Rounded spreadD
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From To Change
Unrated borrowerD 39.0% 85.7% 46.7%
Borrower without tickerD 69.3% 73.3% 4.0%
Previous borrower 70.9% 70.3% -0.6%
Former lead arrangerD 66.1% 64.2% -2.0%
Spread level 52.3% 84.3% 32.0%
Relative loan size 70.7% 70.6% -0.1%
Large loanD 71.5% 57.2% -14.3%
Lead arranger market share 71.3% 68.8% -2.5%
Top lead arrangerD 71.6% 69.6% -2.0%
Panel B: Predicted probabilities of a loan being priced at a rounded spread 
above LIBOR
Predicted probabilities based on 
regression (4) in Panel A
Table V
Determinants of spread rounding
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Unrated borrowerD 0.046 *** 0.357 *** 0.044 *** 0.164 *** 0.172 ***
8.370 27.870 8.290 25.360 22.100
Borrower without tickerD 0.000 0.028 *** 0.000 0.012 *** 0.012 ***
0.720 2.820 1.280 2.660 2.630
Previous borrower 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
-0.070 -0.070 -0.210 -0.210 -0.210
Former lead arrangerD -0.001 -0.023 ** -0.001 * -0.011 ** -0.011 **
-1.560 -2.580 -1.640 -2.440 -2.460
Spread level 0.000 * 0.002 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
1.780 25.070 2.230 21.520 21.610
Relative loan size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.210 -0.210 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340
Large loanD -0.003 * -0.122 *** -0.004 ** -0.061 *** -0.061 ***
-1.750 -12.660 -2.180 -12.710 -12.920
Top lead arrangerD -0.002 *** -0.056 *** -0.002 ** -0.026 *** -0.026 ***
-1.670 -5.120 -2.010 -4.870 -4.920
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Loan purpose dummies yes yes
Pseudo log-likelihood -19,984
Pseudo R
2
0.105
Number of observations 16,598
-15,729
0.134
16,598
Rounding at 
multiples of 25 bp 
but not 50 bp
Rounding at 
multiples of 50 bp
Rounding at 
multiples of 25 bp 
but not 50 bp or 
100 bp
Rounding at 
multiples of 50 bp 
but not 100 bp
Rounding at 
multiples of 100 bp
Table VI
Determinants of the degree of spread rounding
This table shows results of ordered logit regressions. The ordered logit regression captures the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. In regression
model (1), the dependent variable is split into 3 categories: non-rounded spreads, spreads rounded at multiples of 25 bp but not 50 bp, spreads rounded at
multiples of 50 bp. In regression model (2), the dependent variable is split into 4 categories: non-rounded spreads, spreads rounded at multiples of 25 bp
but not 50 bp or 100 bp, spreads rounded at multiples of 50 bp but not 100 bp, spreads rounded at multiples of 100 bp. The marginal effect is reported in
the top row and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom row. For dummy variables, the marginal effect of a change from 0 to 1 is reported. All marginal
effects are calculated at the means. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The regression model contains an
intercept. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
(1) (2)
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Dependent variable
Unrated borrowerD 0.466 *** 0.472 *** 0.464 *** 0.440 ***
28.360 28.670 28.200 25.070
Borrower without tickerD 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.034 ***
3.150 3.070 3.210 2.830
Previous borrower -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
-1.000 -1.010 -1.030 -1.270
Former lead arrangerD -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.026 ** -0.025 **
-2.370 -2.370 -2.360 -2.250
Spread level 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
25.090 25.870 25.090 24.240
Relative loan size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.360 -0.370 -0.380 -0.530
Large loanD -0.172 *** -0.173 *** -0.168 *** -0.146 ***
-14.510 -14.230 -14.370 -12.670
Top lead arrangerD -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.064 *** -0.059 ***
-4.940 -4.780 -4.830 -4.550
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Loan purpose dummies yes yes yes yes
Pseudo log-likelihood -7,842 -7,723 -7,804 -7,510
Pseudo R
2
0.258 0.255 0.253 0.216
Number of observations 16,317 15,874 16,200 15,131
Table VII
Robustness checks regarding loans with extreme spreads
Exclude top 1% 
spreads
Exclude top 5% 
spreads
Exclude top and 
bottom 1% 
spreads
Exclude top and 
bottom 5% 
spreads
This table shows results of logit regressions based on reduced samples. The dependent variable is coded as 1
when the spread over LIBOR of the loan tranche is rounded at 25 or a mutliple thereof and 0 otherwise. The
marginal effect is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom row. For dummy variables,
the marginal effect of a change from 0 to 1 is reported. All marginal effects are calculated at the means. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The regression model contains an
intercept. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower level. Subscript D indicates
a dummy variable.
Rounded spreadD
(1) (4)(2) (3)
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Dependent variable
Intercept 1.001 ***
9.270
Unrated borrowerD 0.629 ***
21.770
Borrower without tickerD 0.038 *
1.660
Previous borrower 0.005
0.310
Former lead arrangerD -0.046 **
-2.430
Spread level 0.004 ***
21.310
Relative loan size -0.001 *
-1.760
Large loanD -0.297 ***
-14.050
Top lead arrangerD -0.078 ***
-3.400
Year dummies yes
Industry dummies yes
Loan purpose dummies yes
Pseudo log-likelihood -12,083
Pseudo R
2
0.152
Number of observations 16,598
This table shows results of tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the
number of base rates with rounded spreads as a fraction of the total number of 
base rates. The coefficient is reported in the top row and the t-statistic is
reported in the bottom row. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust
and clustered at the borrower level. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
Fraction of base rates with 
rounded spread
Table VIII
Determinants of fraction of base rates with rounded spreads
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Rounded spreadD
Spread level Spread over LIBOR in basis points from the “Base Rate Margin” field in LPC’s Dealscan database.
Unrated borrowerD
Borrower without tickerD
Previous borrower
Former lead arrangerD
Relative loan size
Large LoanD
Lead arranger market share
Top lead arrangerD
S&P senior debt rating class BD
S&P senior debt rating class CD
S&P senior debt rating class DD
Borrower size Natural logarithm of the borrower's sales volume in millions of dollars at the time of loan signing.
Tranche size Natural logarithm of the tranche amount in millions of dollar.
Loan maturity Natural logarithm of average maturity across all tranches belonging to the same deal, measured in years.
SecuredD
SeniorD
CovenantsD
Term loanD Dummy=1 if at least one tranche in the deal is a term loan, 0 otherwise.
Multiple trancheD Dummy=1 if deal consists of more than one tranche, 0 otherwise.
Year dummies
Loan purpose dummies
Industry dummies
Dummies indicating in which year the loan was signed. Individual dummies for each year from 1988 to 2010 are created. The dummy for year 
1988 is excluded as the benchmark year.
Dummies indicating the different reasons why borrowers raised funds based on Dealscan's "Primary Loan Purpose" field. Individual 
dummies for acquisition, corporate purpose, and debt repayment are created. The dummy for working capital is excluded as the benchmark 
loan purpose.
Dummies for the industry of the borrower based on Dealscan's "Major Industry Group" field. Individual dummies for financial services, 
general manufacturing, healthcare, oil and gas, retail & supermarkets, and technology are created. The dummy for aerospace is excluded as 
the benchmark industry.
Dummy=1 for tranches with covenants, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy=1 for loans that belong to the top-33% of the sample in terms of loan size in the year of loan signing. 
Dummy=1 for secured tranches, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy=1 for senior loan tranches, 0 otherwise
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has S&P senior debt rating in class B, 0 otherwise.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has S&P senior debt rating in class C, 0 otherwise.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has S&P senior debt rating in class D, 0 otherwise.
Table A-I
Variable definitions
Dummy = 1 if the loan tranche is priced at a spread of 25 basis points or a multiple thereof, 0 otherwise.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has no S&P senior debt rating, 0 otherwise.
Dummy = 1 if the borrower has no ticker, 0 otherwise.
Tranche amount divided by borrower sales. 
Lead arranger reputation measured by the market share of the lead arranger in the year prior to loan signing (1=1%). Average market share 
in case of multiple lead arrangers, 0 otherwise.
Dummy = 1 if at least of the lead arrangers is among the three lead arrangers with the highest market share in the year of loan signing, 0 
otherwise.
Dummy=1 if the lead arranger has been a lead arranger to the same borrower in 3 years prior to loan signing, 0 otherwise.
Number of loans rasied by a borrower in 3 years prior to loan signing.
